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Direct Democracy as a Legislative Act
Henry Noyes*
INTRODUCTION
Direct democracy has been referred to as “The People’s Law”1
and “Citizen Lawmaking.”2 The actors who engage in acts of
direct democracy have been referred to as “Citizen Lawmakers”3
and “Citizens as Legislators.”4 Does that mean that citizens who
engage in acts of direct democracy are literally (and legally)
“legislators” undertaking legislative acts? This Article argues
that, at least in certain situations, the answer is “yes” and
considers the implications of that conclusion.
Part I briefly discusses the history of direct democracy in the
United States. Direct democracy was born out of frustration with
reliance on elected representatives to legislate. Direct democracy
allows ordinary citizens to legislate. Part II explains that direct
democracy does not diminish some inherent, immutable power of
the legislature. Instead, it is an exercise of the people’s inherent
power to legislate. All power derives from the people, who can
choose to delegate it to representative instruments which they
create, or they can reserve to themselves the power to legislate.
Several states—Arizona, California, Washington, Colorado,
Oregon, and Utah—have constitutions that define the initiative
and referendum as the exercise of legislative power. Part III
discusses the circumstances in which direct democracy activity is
a legally operative legislative act. At a minimum, the act of
sponsoring an initiative or referendum petition is a legislative
act. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the possible legal
implications of the conclusion that direct democracy (or at least
some such activity) is a legislative act. First, undertaking a
legislative act does not implicate the First Amendment. Second,

Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
See generally CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE’S LAW OR POPULAR
PARTICIPATION IN LAW-MAKING (1909).
2 See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAWMAKING (SUNY
Press, 2d ed. 2014) (1999).
3 DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION, at
ix (1989).
4 Samuel C. Patterson, Foreword to CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES, at viii (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
*
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undertaking a legislative act entails legislative immunity and a
legislative privilege. Third, direct democracy as a legislative act
(in some cases) will confer the official proponents with standing
to defend the initiative against legal challenge.
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Direct democracy has existed in the United States since the
first town hall meetings were held in the American colonies in
the 1600s.5 These town hall meetings allowed citizens to propose
new laws and to veto laws passed by their elected
representatives. Three of the earliest state constitutions included
some features of direct democracy. The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 provided for the recall of public officials.6
The Massachusetts and New Hampshire Constitutions were the
product of citizen lawmaking. These states held constitutional
conventions at which citizens drafted a constitution and then
submitted it to the people for their approval.7
Modern direct democracy began with the adoption and
implementation of the primary tools of direct democracy—the
ballot initiative, the referendum and the recall election—in the
late 1800s and the early 1900s as a result of the Populist and
Progressive movements.8 Populists wanted to take back control of
government for ordinary citizens from the hands of the moneyed
elite. Progressives wanted to improve government by making it
more responsive to the will of the people and less corrupt. The
ballot initiative allows the people of a state (or local government)
to make law without action by their elected representatives. The
referendum allows the people of a state (or local government) to
have submitted for their approval any law enacted by their
elected representatives.
The initiative operates entirely outside the States’ representative
assemblies; it allows “voters [to] petition to propose statutes or
constitutional amendments to be adopted or rejected by the voters at
the polls.” While the initiative allows the electorate to adopt positive
legislation, the referendum serves as a negative check. It allows
“voters [to] petition to refer a legislative action to the voters [for
approval or disapproval] at the polls. “The initiative [thus] corrects
sins of omission” by representative bodies, while the “referendum
corrects sins of commission.”9

5 See, e.g., LOBINGIER, supra note 1, at 81; Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015).
6 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE RECALL: TRIBUNAL OF THE PEOPLE 7 (SUNY Press, 2d
ed. 2013) (1970).
7 HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 4 (2014).
8 Id. at 9–10.
9 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2660 (citations omitted) (quoting Lewis J.
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Between 1898 and 1918, twenty-four states adopted the
initiative, the referendum, or both.10 Today, three states utilize
the veto referendum, three states utilize the ballot initiative and,
twenty-one states utilize both the veto referendum and the ballot
initiative.11
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS AN EXERCISE OF THE PEOPLE’S
INHERENT LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. All Political Power Is Inherent in the People
Direct democracy is an exercise of the people’s inherent
legislative power. It is not a delegation of power from the state
legislature, nor is it a diminishment of power inherent in the
state legislature. It is a direct and express exercise of the people’s
inherent legislative power.12
This concept—that the power to legislate and govern is an
exercise of the people’s inherent power—is expressed in the
Declaration of Independence13 and the constitution of every state
except New York.14 The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated that
“the animating principle of our Constitution [is] that the people
themselves are the originating source of all the powers of
government.”15 Because the people hold the power to legislate,
they may choose to delegate this power to representatives, or
they may choose to reserve the power for themselves. Direct
democracy is the most direct expression of the people’s power to
govern themselves.16
Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 139, 142 (William B. Munro ed., 1912); DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1984)).
10 NOYES, supra note 7, at 10.
11 Id. at 78 tbl.3.1, 104 tbl.4.1.
12 See id. at 10–12.
13 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed . . . [and] it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such
Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”).
14 NOYES, supra note 7, at 11 (setting forth all citations in every state constitution,
except New York, that support the proposition that all political power is inherent in the
people).
15 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671
(2015); see also id. at 2675 (“[O]ur fundamental instrument of government derives its
authority from ‘We the People.’”); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”); id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
16 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (“[T]he invention of the initiative was in
full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental
power.”).
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B. The Initiative and the Referendum Are Part of the People’s
Legislative Power
The Supreme Court has declared that—in states that adopt
these tools of direct democracy—use of the initiative or the
referendum is an exercise of the people’s legislative power. In
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant17 the Supreme Court considered
an early challenge to Ohio’s use of the referendum power.
Hildebrant involved an amendment to the Constitution of Ohio
that adopted the veto referendum.18
[T]he legislative power was expressly declared to be vested not only in
the senate and house of representatives of the state, constituting the
general assembly, but in the people, in whom a right was reserved by
way of referendum to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law
enacted by the general assembly.19

The Ohio General Assembly passed an act redistricting Ohio
for the purpose of congressional elections, and the Governor
approved the act. The requisite number of Ohio electors then
signed a referendum petition and the measure was put to a
popular vote.20 The voters disapproved the law and Ohio state
election officials filed an action seeking to declare the referendum
void as violative of the Elections Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.21 The Elections Clause of Article I of the
Constitution provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .22

The elections officials claimed that “the referendum vote was not
and could not be a part of the legislative authority of the state.”23
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge to Ohio’s
referendum power. The Court held that the State of Ohio had the
power to allocate its governmental authority according to the
wishes of the people of Ohio, including the power to legislate.
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566–67 (1916).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 567. The elections officials also claimed that the referendum violated the
Guarantee Clause. See id. at 569. Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Supreme Court rejected that challenge
because it did not present a justiciable issue. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 570. For a discussion
of challenges to direct democracy as violative of the Republican Guarantee Clause, see
NOYES, supra note 7, at 12–29 and authorities cited therein.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
23 Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 567.
17
18
19
20
21
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Ohio, like numerous other states, had amended its state
constitution to incorporate the power of referendum. The Ohio
Supreme Court had determined that the amendment to the state
constitution was valid—that is, the referendum power
constituted a part of the state constitution and laws.24 That
determination was binding on the U.S. Supreme Court. The
U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the referendum was
“part of the [state] legislative power”25 consistent with the
Elections Clause and answered in the affirmative. Congress had
the power to alter Ohio’s redistricting scheme, but the Supreme
Court noted that Congress, in recognition of the direct democracy
movement, had modified the applicable federal statutes “to provide
that where, by the state Constitution and laws, the referendum
was treated as a part of the legislative power, the power as thus
constituted should be held and treated to be the state legislative
power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law.”26
The Supreme Court again recognized the right of the people
to retain their legislative power, and also made clear that the
referendum did not constitute an improper delegation of
legislative power, in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc.27 City of Eastlake involved a challenge to a city charter
provision requiring “that any changes in land use agreed to by
the Council be approved by a 55% Vote in a referendum.”28
Plaintiffs argued that the Ohio city’s adoption of this referendum
requirement for certain zoning changes was an unconstitutional
delegation to the people of a legislative power. The Court rejected
that challenge, stating:
A referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of
power. Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from
the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which
they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve
to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might
otherwise be assigned to the legislature.29

The Court confirmed that the people may choose to delegate their
legislative power to elected representatives, but they also may
choose to retain their legislative power.
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 568; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2015) (“For redistricting purposes, Hildebrant thus established,
‘the Legislature’ did not mean the representative body alone. Rather, the word
encompassed a veto power lodged in the people.”).
26 Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 568.
27 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“In
establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly
with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.”).
28 Id. at 670.
29 Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
24
25
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In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission,30 the Court confirmed that the
exercise of the initiative power is an exercise of the people’s
legislative power. By ballot initiative, the people of Arizona
amended the Arizona Constitution to remove redistricting
authority—the power to create and adopt congressional and state
legislative districts—from the Arizona Legislature and to vest it
in an independent commission.31 The Arizona Legislature sued,
complaining that Arizona’s exercise of direct democracy violated
the Elections Clause of Article I of the Constitution.32 In short,
the Court had to determine whether the phrase “the Legislature”
in the Elections Clause included only Arizona’s official body of
elected representatives (the Arizona House and Senate) or
whether “the Legislature” also included the Arizona voters when
engaged in direct democracy.
The Court held that the “lawmaking power in Arizona
includes the initiative process.”33 When the voters engaged in
direct democracy, they constituted “the Legislature.”
The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in
which the people of a State exercise legislative power coextensive with
the authority of an institutional legislature. But the invention of the
initiative was in full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of
the people as the font of governmental power.34

The Court recognized the right and power of individual
states to determine the structure of their government and to
determine who may exercise governmental authority.35 The
U.S. Supreme Court considered the text of the Arizona
Constitution, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of
that text, and concluded “the Arizona Constitution ‘establishes
the electorate [of Arizona] as a coordinate source of legislation’ on
equal footing with the representative legislative body.”36

Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
33 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659; see also id. at 2660 n.3 (“The people’s
sovereign right to incorporate themselves into a State’s lawmaking apparatus, by
reserving for themselves the power to adopt laws and to veto measures passed by elected
representatives, is one this Court has ranked a nonjusticiable political matter.”).
34 Id. at 2674.
35 Id. at 2673.
36 Id. at 2660 (quoting Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai City Bd. of
Supervisors, 501 P.2d 391, 393 (Ariz. 1972)); see also id. at 2673 (“Arizona engaged in
definition of that kind when its people placed both the initiative power and the AIRC’s
redistricting authority in the portion of the Arizona Constitution delineating the State’s
legislative authority.”).
30
31
32
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C. State Constitutions Define the Initiative and Referendum as
the Exercise of Legislative Power
A number of states in addition to Arizona have state
constitutions that define the initiative and referendum as the
exercise of legislative power. Article IV of the California
Constitution states: “The legislative power of this State is vested
in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and
Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of
initiative and referendum.”37 The California Supreme Court has
interpreted the initiative power to “represent[] an exercise by the
people of their reserved power to legislate.”38 In the Washington
Constitution, the initiative power and referendum powers are
found in article II (“Legislative Department”), section 1
(“Legislative Powers, Where Vested”).39 The Washington
Supreme Court has stated that the “exercise of the initiative
power is an exercise of the reserved power of the people to
legislate” and that “[in] approving an initiative measure, the
people exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature
does when enacting a statute.”40 In the Colorado Constitution,
the initiative and referendum powers are found in article V
(“Legislative Department”),41 and the Colorado Supreme Court
has stated that “the people have reserved for themselves the
right to legislate.”42 Oregon and Utah also have concluded that
the exercise of the initiative and referendum power is the
exercise of the people’s legislative power.43

CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Builders Ass’n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d
582, 586 (Cal. 1974).
39 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1.
40 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 779 (Wash. 2000).
41 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the
general assembly consisting of a senate and house of representatives, both to be elected by
the people, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent
of the general assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at
the polls any act or item, section, or part of any act of the general assembly.”).
42 McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980).
43 See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state, except for the
initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people, is vested in a Legislative
Assembly, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”); MacPherson v. Dep’t
of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 314 (Or. 2006) (“In Oregon, the Legislative Assembly and
the people, acting through the initiative or referendum processes, share in exercising
legislative power.”); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“The Legislative Power of the State shall be
vested in: (a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the
Legislature of the State of Utah; and (b) the people of the State of Utah . . . .”); Gallivan
v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002) (“[T]he Utah Constitution vests the people’s
sovereign legislative power in both (1) a representative legislature and (2) the people of
the State, in whom all political power is inherent.”).
37
38
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III. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS LEGISLATIVE ACT
A. Initiative Petition Circulation and Signature-Gathering and
the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has reviewed various state law
requirements relating to direct democracy activities and has
assessed these requirements against First Amendment
challenges. In Meyer v. Grant,44 the Court considered a challenge
to Colorado’s ban on payment of petition circulators. The Court
found that “circulation of an initiative petition of necessity
involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a
discussion of the merits of the proposed change.”45 The Court
concluded that the Colorado law involved a limitation on political
expression and was, therefore, subject to exacting scrutiny under
the First Amendment.46 The Court struck down the Colorado law
because circulation of a petition involved “core political speech”
that was not justified by the State’s “interest in making sure that
an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the
ballot, or by its interest in protecting the integrity of the
initiative process.”47
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc.,48 the Court struck down Colorado’s requirement that
initiative petition circulators wear an I.D. badge bearing the
circulator’s name, as well as its requirement that initiative
proponents report the names, addresses, and compensation
received by each paid initiative circulator. The Court determined
that the petition circulators’ and the petition signatories’ conduct
expressed a political view and, therefore, implicated a First
Amendment right.49
Constitutional Law Professor Akihil Reed Amar criticized
the Court’s conclusion—that initiative petition circulation and
signature gathering constitutes expressive activity entitled to
First Amendment protection—shortly after the A.C.L.F. opinion
was issued.
The Colorado initiative process is not about “petitions.” It’s about
state lawmaking. Strictly speaking, the state was not regulating
“petitions” or “speech” at all. It was merely saying that unless
signatures were collected in a certain way, they would not count for
purposes of the state initiative process. In other words, anyone in

44
45
46
47
48
49

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420, 425.
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
See id. at 192.

Do Not Delete

2016]

3/5/2016 12:01 PM

Direct Democracy as a Legislative Act

207

Colorado has a right to petition to his heart’s content—to do so
anonymously and with no disclosure, even if he is not a registered
voter. But he has no First Amendment right to insist that Colorado
treat his petition as anything more than a handbill. Most importantly,
Colorado was not trying to treat a nonconforming signature as
anything less than a handbill, fully protected by the First
Amendment. Colorado merely said that unless its rules were followed,
any signature gathered would be treated as a petition, pure and
simple.
To see the point another way, imagine that I go to Denver next
week and demand a right to vote for Mickey Mouse as governor.
Surely Colorado need not count my vote in the next election because
(a) I am not a registered Colorado voter, (b) Mickey Mouse is not an
eligible candidate, and (c) the state may properly insist that all ballots
be cast on election day, or pursuant to a regulated absentee ballot
system. In one sense I can “vote” for Mickey—just watch me!—and the
state would be wrong to punish me. But the state has a perfect right
not to count my vote. The facts of Buckley are no different.50

Professor Akhil Amar’s brother, Constitutional Law Professor
Vikram David Amar, used the same reasoning to argue that the
signing of an initiative is not subject to First Amendment
protection because it is citizen lawmaking.
The Court’s reasoning in [the A.C.L.F. and Meyer v. Grant] cases
seems plausible if plaintiffs were “petitioning” within the meaning of
the First Amendment. But that label is inapt. The Colorado initiative
process is not about “petitioning the Government for a redress of
grievances.” It is about circumventing government by engaging in
lawmaking itself. Thus, state law did not regulate “petitions” or
“speech” at all. Instead, it merely provided that unless signatures
were collected in a certain way, they would not count for purposes of
qualifying an initiative for the statewide ballot.51

These commentators suggest that the ballot initiative process
consists of legally operative legislative acts that are not subject to
First Amendment protection.
B. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed and the Disclosure of the Identity of
Petition Signatories
In John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,52 the Supreme Court considered
a challenge to the State of Washington’s Public Records
Akhil Reed Amar, The Five-Legged Dog, AM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 47, 47.
Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional
Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 929 (2004); see also
S.F. Forty-Niners v. Nishioka, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 388, 396 (Ct. App. 1999) (“The initiative
petition with its notice of intention is not a handbill or campaign flyer—it is an official
election document . . . . It is the constitutionally and legislatively sanctioned method by
which an election is obtained on a given initiative proposal.”).
52 John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
50
51
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Act,53 which authorizes private parties to obtain copies of
government documents, including referendum petitions revealing
the identities of petition signatories. The State of Washington
argued that Washington’s disclosure requirements did not
implicate First Amendment rights because “signing a petition is
a legally operative legislative act, not speech.”54
The act of signing an initiative petition is a legislative act
because the electors are exercising legislative power and acting
as citizen legislators. No one person can place a measure on the
ballot. It requires the support of other electors in order to qualify
for the ballot. This requirement—gathering signatures to ensure
a significant level of support for placing the measure on the
ballot—“is analogous to the parliamentary rule that a motion
must be seconded before it will be considered.”55 Individual
electors do not control the content of the petition. Once the
official sponsor supplies the appropriate state official with a
petition in proper form for circulation, the electors can choose to
sign the petition or not. They can lobby others to sign (or not to
sign) the petition—certainly expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment—but the decision whether to sign is
binary: “Yes” or “No.” Each signature has exactly the same legal
effect. It is a legally operative legislative act.
Several prominent legal scholars agree with this position.56
Professor Eugene Volokh wrote:
[P]olitical statements are just speech. Signing an initiative,
referendum, or recall petition is a legally operative act—it helps
achieve a particular result not just because of its persuasiveness, but
because it is given legal effect by the state election law.
The government is surely entitled to require that people who want
their signature to have such a legally operative effect must disclose
their identities to the government. And I see no reason why the
government might not then disclose those identities to the public, who
after all are in charge of the government. To do that is to inform the
people about who is taking legally operative steps to change the
state’s laws (or the state’s elected representatives, in the case of a
recall).57
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.001–42.56.904 (West 2015).
Brief of Respondent Sam Reed at 22, Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559).
DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE: THE INITIATIVE, THE
REFERENDUM, AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 16 (Da Capo Press 1972)
(1912); see also Brief of Respondent Sam Reed, supra note 54, at 26–28.
56 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Direct Democracy Scholars in Support of Respondents
at 7, Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559) (“The referendum is a legislative act and is central to
the lawmaking process in Washington.”); id. at 5 (“This Court has never decided whether
the act of signing, as distinct from circulating, a petition is a form of ‘core political
speech.’”).
57 Eugene Volokh, Federal Judge Temporarily Restrains Release of Names of
53
54
55
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The Supreme Court ultimately determined, however, that
the petition circulators’ and the petition signatories’ conduct
expressed a political view and, therefore, implicated a First
Amendment right.58 The Court considered the argument that
“signing a petition is a legally operative legislative act” and,
therefore, not subject to First Amendment protection, but
concluded that “[p]etition signing remains expressive even when
it has legal effect in the electoral process.”59 The Court reviewed
such challenges under “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a
‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a
‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”60
Justice Scalia concurred with the Supreme Court’s judgment
in Reed, but he wrote separately to express his “doubt” that the
act of signing a referendum petition implicates “the ‘freedom of
speech’ at all.”61 For Justice Scalia, an elector’s conduct in
signing a referendum petition was a legislative act:
A voter who signs a referendum petition is therefore exercising
legislative power because his signature, somewhat like a vote for or
against a bill in the legislature, seeks to affect the legal force of the
measure at issue.62

Justice Scalia noted that the Reed plaintiffs could not identify
any Supreme Court precedent “holding that legislating is
protected by the First Amendment.”63
While no other justices joined Justice Scalia’s concurrence, it
raises several interesting questions: Are there some direct
democracy procedures that are, in fact, legislative acts? If so,
what is the significance of a legislative act? What is the legal
significance, if any, of citizens as legislators?

Anti-Domestic-Partnership Petition Signers in Washington States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Sept. 11, 2009, 9:57 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/chain_1245174890.shtml [http://
perma.cc/T7Y7-BQA4]; see also Rick Hasen, Ninth Circuit Issues Its Opinion Explaining
Its Ruling in Washington R-71 Referendum Case, ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2009,
4:25 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/014620.html [http://perma.cc/X6U3-L9PU]
(“What about Burdick v. Takushi, and the Supreme Court's rejection of the idea that
voting is an expressive activity entitled to First Amendment protection? Does this or does
this not apply to signing a ballot measure petition?”).
58 Reed, 561 U.S. at 195.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 196 (citations omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010)).
61 Id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 221–22.
63 Id. at 222; cf. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 595–602 (2d Cir. 2009)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that New York unreasonably burdened the First Amendment
rights clustered around the state’s initiative process by allowing legislative bodies to
amend popularly passed measures and holding that plaintiffs’ argument did not even
raise a First Amendment issue).
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C. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris
and the Role of the Official Proponent
In Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition
v. Norris,64 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered First
Amendment challenges to requirements of the State of California
and the City of Chula Vista (i) that the official proponent of a
ballot measure (the person who sponsors a local ballot measure)
must be an elector (and therefore not a corporation) and (ii) that
the name of the official proponent (the person who sponsors a
local ballot measure) appear on each section of the petition that
is circulated to voters for their signature. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the elector requirement because it “does not impose any
meaningful burden on First Amendment rights.”65 The City and
State defendants contended that the elector requirement did not
implicate First Amendment rights “because it is a regulation of
the legislative process,” but the court declined to decide that
question, given that the elector requirement survived First
Amendment scrutiny.66 The court described the elector
requirement as a “legislative power,” and noted that “many
legislative and official political acts are properly reserved to
members of the electorate.”67
The initiative power that California and the City of Chula Vista have
reserved to electors is indisputably a legislative power. . . . Much like
a legislator who begins the traditional legislative process by placing a
bill in the hopper, an official proponent commences the process of
legislating by initiative by asking voters to sign a petition to place an
initiative on the ballot. Thus, by seeking to serve as official
proponents, the plaintiffs seek to wield a legislative power.68

The official proponent of a ballot initiative serves a “unique
role” in the legislative process that is distinct from the role of other
electors who may support the ballot initiative. The official
proponent controls and manages the initiative process—preparing
the text of the petition, filing it, managing the signature-gathering
process and the signature gatherers, filing the signatures, and
responding to challenges to the petitions and signatures.69 In
California, the official proponent also has special authority to
defend the initiative against legal challenge, if public officials
decline to do so.70
64 Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
65 Id. at 529.
66 Id. at 529 n.8.
67 Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 529–30 (citations omitted).
69 Id. at 530.
70 Id. (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011)); see also infra
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Thus, while all California voters play a quasi-legislative role in the
initiative process, the official proponent is particularly akin to a
legislator—sponsoring legislation and shepherding it through the
legislative process. Indeed, like a legislator introducing legislation,
and unlike a mere lobbyist (the plaintiffs’ preferred characterization),
an official proponent performs a series of necessary steps for the
people to exercise the power to legislate by initiative.71

The Ninth Circuit also applied exacting scrutiny to the
disclosure requirement and upheld that requirement.72 The en
banc panel acknowledged that the “legislative character of an
initiative petition inform[ed] [its] analysis,”73 but it did not
consider whether the disclosure requirement was a “legislative
act.” Instead, the “legislative character” and the public nature of
being the “official proponent” influenced the court’s First
Amendment analysis and the court concluded that exacting
scrutiny—not strict scrutiny—applied.74
D. When Direct Democracy Is a Legislative Act
The more that direct democracy procedures regulate
advocacy for, and circulation of, an initiative petition, the more
that these procedures regulate “core political speech.”75 But these
activities are different from the mechanics of initiation of a
petition.76
Voters act as legislators in the ballot-measure context, and interest
groups and individuals advocating a measure’s defeat or passage act
as lobbyists; both groups aim at pressuring the public to pass or defeat
legislation. We think Californians, as lawmakers, have an interest in
knowing who is lobbying for their vote, just as members of Congress
may require lobbyists to disclose who is paying for the lobbyists’
services and how much.77

The act of sponsoring an initiative or referendum petition—
drafting and submitting it to the Secretary of State—is a
necessary first step in law-making. It is a legislative act that can
only be done by the members of the relevant legislative body—
Section IV.C.
71 Id. at 530–31.
72 Id. at 535–42.
73 Id. at 536.
74 Id. at 536–37.
75 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988) (involving a law that placed a
ban on payment of signature gatherers); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (involving a statute that required initiative petition
circulators to wear I.D. badge bearing circulator’s name and initiative proponents to
report names, addresses, and amounts paid to each paid initiative circulator).
76 See Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 875 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1133–35 (S.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 755 F.3d 671
(9th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 782 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015).
77 Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).
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here, the electors—who choose to sponsor a proposed initiative.78
Likewise, an initiative or referendum petition that is filed with
the state (usually the Secretary of State) is a legislative
document, and the act of filing a petition is a legislative act.79 In
addition, the act of submitting petition signatures to the state to
qualify for the ballot is a legislative act that is performed by the
sponsors of an initiative.
Individual states may require direct democracy actions by
the sponsor of an initiative or referendum that constitute
legislative acts. In Utah, for example, the official sponsors of an
initiative must hold seven public hearings in different geographic
regions of the state.80 The official sponsors must provide notice of
the hearings, and either video tape or audio tape the meeting or
“take comprehensive minutes of the pubic hearing, detailing the
names and titles of each speaker and summarizing each
speaker’s comments.”81
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS A LEGISLATIVE ACT
A. No First Amendment Protection
As noted above, if a particular act of direct democracy is a
legislative act it may take the activity outside the scope of the
First Amendment.82 The more that the activity in question
involves the mechanics of initiation of a petition and submission
of the petition to qualify for the ballot, the more likely that it is a
legislative act that is outside the scope of the First Amendment.
But what other legal implications, if any, are there for legislative
acts undertaken by citizen lawmakers?
B. Legislative Immunity
The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is well established
that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to
absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative
activities.”83 If direct democracy constitutes a legislative act and
Chula Vista, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
This distinction between expressive activity and the mechanics of legislation is the
reason that a majority of courts have held that initiative and referendum subject matter
restrictions do not raise a free speech issue. See NOYES, supra note 7, at 109–20; see also
Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(“[The First Amendment] does not apply to structural principles of government making
some outcomes difficult or impossible to achieve.”).
80 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-204.1 (West 2015).
81 Id.
82 See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 222 (2010) (Scalia, J, concurring)
(“Plaintiffs point to no precedent from this Court holding that legislating is protected by
the First Amendment.”).
83 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998); see also Supreme Court of Va.
78
79
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if the official sponsors of an initiative or referendum petition are
acting as legislators when they (1) sponsor an initiative or
referendum, (2) file an initiative or referendum petition, and
(3) file petition signatures with the state, then they may be
entitled to legislative immunity for these legislative acts that
they undertake.84
Legislative immunity provides immunity from trial and from
civil and criminal liability for performing legislative acts.85
Legislative acts include sponsoring and introducing a bill,86
which is akin to being an official sponsor of an initiative or
referendum petition and filing the petition with the state.
Legislative acts also may include holding hearings on proposed
legislation.87
The doctrine of legislative immunity does not prevent a court
from declaring a legislative act to be unconstitutional,88 but it
does protect those engaging in the legislative act from liability for
the act.89 The legislative immunity doctrine also includes the
legislative testimonial privilege90 and a ban on inquiry into the
motive behind legislative action.91
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (“[The Court has] recognized
that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts,
an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under
the Speech or Debate Clause.”). As of 2003, forty-three state constitutions contained one
or more provisions granting state legislators a legal privilege in connection with their
legislative work. See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege
in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2003). Despite not having such a
provision in their state constitutions, several of the remaining seven states have
recognized some type of legislative immunity by statute or judicial opinion. Id. at 237–38
n.54. California, for example, recognizes the principle of legislative immunity. See Steiner
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[L]egislators have absolute
immunity from damage suits based on legislative acts.”).
84 See Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[I]f legislators of any
political subdivision of a state function in a legislative capacity, they are absolutely
immune from being sued . . . .”).
85 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); see also Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 446 U.S. at 720.
86 See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); see also Hinshaw v. Smith,
436 F.3d 997, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 2006).
87 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972).
88 See Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991); see also
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
89 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
90 See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 615–16 (stating that privilege against testifying
concerning legislative activities applies in a criminal case to senator and also to the
legislator’s aides). The legislative testimonial privilege applies in civil cases in which the
legislator is a party. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502–03
(1975). In addition, it applies in civil cases in which the legislator is not a party. See
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that legislative
testimony privilege protects a legislator from having to testify in a civil action in which
the legislator is not a party concerning the legislator’s “legislative acts”).
91 See Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979) (granting protective
order in favor of state legislator prohibiting inquiry into “any legislative activity or his
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C. Standing to Defend the Initiative
Direct democracy as a legislative act also may impact the
initiative proponents’ standing to defend the initiative against
legal challenge. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,92 the Supreme Court
was asked to address the merits of Proposition 8—California’s
ballot initiative to amend the California Constitution to
eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. Plaintiffs had
challenged Proposition 8 as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of California
“refused to defend [Proposition 8], although they . . . continued to
enforce it throughout [the] litigation.” Thus, the federal district
court allowed the official proponents to intervene and defend the
action.93 Article III standing was not an issue because the
plaintiffs were aggrieved—Proposition 8 prevented them from
getting married.94 The district court then held a two-week long
trial and found that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection
Clause.95
Standing became an issue upon appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Plaintiffs had won; they had no reason to seek appeal. The State
of California refused to defend Proposition 8, so it did not appeal.
Proposition 8’s proponents appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit asked petitioners (the official Proposition 8
proponents) to address “why this appeal should not be dismissed
for lack of Article III standing.”96 After considering the parties’
responses, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme
Court the question whether, under California law, the official
proponents of a ballot initiative
possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or
the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity,
which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the
initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do
so.97

motive for same” on the basis of federal common law legislative immunity); see also
Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington, 138 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2001);
Steiner v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 676 (Ct. App. 1996) (“An equally
important corollary of the separation of powers doctrine is courts cannot inquire into the
impetus or motive behind legislative action.”).
92 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
93 Id. at 2660.
94 Id. at 2661–62.
95 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
96 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010).
97 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
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The California Supreme Court accepted the question and
answered in the affirmative.98 Based on the California Supreme
Court’s response, the Ninth Circuit held that the official
Proposition 8 proponents had Article III standing to defend the
measure on appeal in federal court, and then affirmed the
district court’s decision on the merits.99
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to address the merits of
Proposition 8. Instead, the Court held that the official
Proposition 8 proponents lacked Article III standing.100 The
Court noted that the proponents were “plainly not agents of the
State—‘formal’ or otherwise”—and that they, “[u]nlike
California’s elected officials, . . . ha[d] taken no oath of office.”101
Professor Vikram David Amar has emphasized the importance of
this distinction:
[A]llowing initiative-proponent standing poses serious problems that
permitting legislator standing does not. Most fundamentally, the fact
that voters adopted an initiative measure that the proponents wrote
and offered does not mean that the electorate decided—or intended—
that these proponents should speak or act for the voters in any
representative capacity.102

This distinction is critical. There is a difference between the
person (or group) who drafts and proposes a law and the
institution or body that is empowered to enact a proposal into
law. It is noteworthy that in the legislator-standing context, the
standing that is permitted is the standing of elected leaders of the
legislative body, who speak not for themselves as individual
lawmakers, but rather on behalf of the entire lawmaking body.
By contrast, the individual members of the legislature who may
have been involved in—or even central to—the proposing,
drafting, or lobbying with respect to a bill generally do not enjoy
standing to defend the measure. As important as these members
might have been in bringing the law about, they are not (and do
not speak for) the entire lawmaking body whose votes made the
proposal law.103
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry did
not, however, resolve the problem of standing when direct
democracy is a legislative act. The Court’s opinion left us in a
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
100 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
101 Id. at 2666–67.
102 Vikram David Amar, Standing Up for Direct Democracy: Who Can Be Empowered
Under Article III to Defend Initiatives In Federal Court?, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 480
(2014).
103 Id. at 480–81 (2014).
98
99
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very curious place where the official proponents of a ballot
initiative will, with increasing frequency, have standing to
defend their initiative against legal attack.
First, the Supreme Court’s opinion held only that the official
proponents lacked standing in federal court to defend their
initiative on appeal.104 The official proponents will continue to be
able to intervene and defend their initiative against attack at
trial when the state fails or refuses to do so. The official
proponents also will continue to have standing in state court to
defend their initiative on appeal. At least where (as in California)
the state supreme court so says. This might lead to an odd
situation: assume that the Proposition 8 plaintiff had brought
their Equal Protection Clause violation claim in California state
court and had prevailed. Assume that the California Supreme
Court determined (as it did) that the official proponents had
standing, under California law, to defend Proposition 8 and also
determined that Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution.
Would the official proponents then have standing, under Article
III, to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court?105
Second, in response to the Supreme Court’s Hollingsworth
decision, ballot initiative proponents are making it express in the
initiative itself that they are agents of the state, thereby
addressing the concern about lack of agency. These official
proponents are also including language in their initiatives that
the electorate decided—and intended—that these proponents
should speak and act for the voters and the state itself in a
representative capacity, thereby addressing the concern raised by
Professor Amar. The language of the initiative that amends the
state constitution empowers the initiative proponents with
standing to defend the initiative in any court proceedings.
The California “Online Privacy” initiative (#14-0007), for
example, contained the following provision:
Proponent Standing.
(a) The people of the State of California declare that the proponents
of this Act have a direct and personal stake in defending this Act
and grant formal authority to the proponents to defend this Act in
any legal proceeding, either by intervening in such legal
proceeding, or by defending the Act on behalf of the people and
the State in the event that the State declines to defend the Act or
declines to appeal an adverse ruling or judgment against the Act.

Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
See NOYES, supra note 7, at 10; William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy”
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263,
294−95 (1990).
104
105
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(b) In the event that the proponents are defending this Act in a legal
proceeding because the State has declined to defend it or to
appeal an adverse ruling or judgment against it, the proponents
shall:
(1) act as agents of the people and the State;
(2) be subject to all ethical, legal, and fiduciary duties applicable
to such parties in such legal proceeding; and
(3) take and be subject to the Oath of Office prescribed by Article
XX, section 3 of the California Constitution for the limited
purpose of acting on behalf of the people and the State in such
legal proceeding.106

An initiative on abortion restrictions being circulated for
signatures for the 2016 ballot contains a similar provision.107
Thus, Hollingsworth did not end the debate over standing of
ballot initiatives’ official proponents. It has led to the practical
expression of direct democracy as legislative act—the official
proponents will ask the electorate to approve the merits of their
initiative and to bless them as the substitute voice of the
legislature.
CONCLUSION
My aim in this Article is two-fold: first, to demonstrate that
states, courts, and direct democracy proponents have begun to
treat direct democracy as a legislative act, and second, to begin to
consider some of the practical and legal consequences of the
conclusion that direct democracy is a legislative act. As people
take political matters into their own hands, they seek to give
themselves greater legislative power and to acquire more of the
perks and powers of being a (citizen) legislator engaging in
legislative acts.

106 The Online Privacy Act, Initiative 14-0007, § 5 (Cal. 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/
system/files/initiatives/pdfs/14-0007%20(14-0007%20(Online%20Privacy%20V2)).pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VR9-ZWBR]; see also Local Control and Accountability in Education
Act, Initiative 15-0078, § 15 (Cal. 2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/
15-0078%20(Certificated%20Employees%20Policy%20Decisions).pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9
W-A4HC].
107 See Parental Notification, Child and Teen Safety, and Stop Sexual Predators and
Sex Traffickers Act, Initiative 15-0025, § 32(u) (Cal. 2015), http://www.oag.ca.gov/system/
files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0025%20%28Parental%20Notification%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/VS
2M-ARBU] (containing a proposed California Constitutional Amendment Initiative
providing that “the following persons, given priority in the order named, shall be
authorized to defend the provisions of this Section approved by voters in any court of law:
any official proponent of this Initiative, his or her designee, and any elector at the time
this Initiative was approved by the voters”).
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